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VENDOR'S DUTY TO INSPECT CHATTELS -A REJOINDER
D. J.

FARAGE

Preliminary to a consideration of the contentions of Professor Eldredge in the
previous article in this issue,' I wish to acknowledge the inadvertent omission of
thirteen words in a quotation I made in my earlier paper 2 from his original text. 8
The original statement made by Mr. Eldredge was as follows:
ly
he
by
of

"Because of these reasons and until quite recently, it has generalbeen thought that a vendor had no duty of inspection; and that
was not liable (in the absence of a warranty) for harm caused
a defect where he did not know it existed or was not possessed
infofmation, which should have made him suspicious."

Because of a stenographic error, the words "where he did not know it existed or
was not possessed of information" were omitted in my quotation. While I have
no objection 4 to Mr. Eldredge's pointing out this omission, I should like to correct
the possible implication that this omission resulted in a misrepresentation of his
views or that it affected the merits of our controversy. It is agreed here and was
agreed in my first answer that a vendor of a chattel is liable if there is, to use Mr.
Eldredge's words, "actual knowledge of the defect or of facts pointing to it." 5
Indeed, I repeated these exact words in my previous article.6 Since these words
in substance supply the inadvertent omission in the aforesaid quotation, I take it
that it is clear that Mr. Eldredge's position was not misrepresented. In any event,
it should be clear that those words have no bearing upon the point in dispute,
which concerns the propriety or impropriety, the existence or non-existence, of a
vendor's duty to make some inspection of chattels he sells.
In his present reply, Mr. Eldredge alleges a failure on my part to note a
"qualification" he attached to his views against imposing a duty of inspection.
He refers to his statement that:
*Professor of Law, Dickinson School of Law.
'In order that the present articles may make complete sense, the reader should have first read
the prior articles: Eldredge, Vendor's Tort Liability (1941)

89 U. OF PA. L. REV. 306; Farage,

Must A Vendor Inspect Chattels Bejore Their Sale?-An Answer (1941)
159.

2
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Farage, supra note 1, at 163.
SEldredge, supra note 1, at 322.
4Albeit I promised, as soon as the error was pointed out, to put a correction in this issue.
5Eldredge, supra note 1, at 329.
6Farage, supra note 1, at 160.
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"There may be a rare and exceptional situation where a defect
will cause a catastrophe and even an off chance that the chattel may
be defective is such as to demand some looking into by the vendor.
But such cases will be few and far between."'
If this was intended as a qualification of his "no-duty-of-inspection view," I do not
so understand it, in the light of this additional statement:
"If danger to the customer and others imposes a duty of inspection, danger from the unobservable but discoverable defect is even
greater because the purchaser cannot observe it. If the presence of
an unobservable defect may bring death why not require the vendor
to employ the facilities of modern testing laboratories to discover it?
Into such a maze do we get once we depart from the rule that the
vendor's liability is predicated upon his knowledge of the danger
creating defect or of other facts from which he has reason to suspect
its existence.""
This would seem to make it clear that he is advocating a flat rule against ever imposing liability for failure to inspect. If "death" is not a sufficient "catastrophe"
to bring his "qualification" into play, I am unable to understand the scope or
content he attributes to this "qualification." In view of his insistence upon certainty
in the law for the vendor, further amplification of this "qualification" would seem
to be in order. One wonders whether the injection of this qualification is not,
to use Mr. Eldredge's own language, a matter of retroactive "benevolent yearning." As I understand the alleged qualifying statement, it was merely a statement of fact, not law, by way of argument to the effect that "catastrophes" and
the like are so rare that no account should be taken of them in determining
whether there should be a duty of inspection. Moreover, while Mr. Eldredge's
article many times reiterated his advocated rule requiring actual knowledge of
dangers or of suspicious facts, he did not repeat the alleged qualification anywhere
else, not even in his conclusion. If Mr. Eldredge did mean to suggest that the
degree of danger is a factor in determining the existence of a duty to inspect, and
that there should be such a duty if the danger threatened is serious 'enough, then
we stand on more common ground, even though such a statement does not afford
the certainty upon which my friend is insistent.
Professor Eldredge next alleges that my contention that a vendor does realize
an economic benefit from the sale of a chattel, supporting an affirmative duty of
inspection, is founded upon a "false" analogy to the duty owing by a possessor
'IEldredge, iupra note 1, at 321.
8id. at 330. Italics added.
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of land to business guests. I submit again that from the standpoint of whether
the vendor derives an economic benefit, the two cases are not only analogous, but
identical. I repeat that:
"I find difficulty in understanding why, although the vendor is
conceded by Mr. Eldredge to have sufficient economic interest in his
trade to justify the imposition of a duty to make a 'reasonable' inspection of the premises for the protection of customers, the same
vendor is deemed not to have a sufficient economic interest in the
same trade which may justify the imposition of a duty 'reasonably'
to inspect stock for the benefit of the same customers. There may
be other reasons, perhaps, for imposing the duty in the one case and
denying it in the other, but the absence of benefit to the vendor seems
a doubtful basis for distinction."'
In other words I have never suggested that the analogy is complete; I have insisted
only that the benefit is identical; that whether tht customer is injured because of a
defect on the premises, or because of a defect in the chattel, the vendor would
seem to derive the same benefit from the sale, Mr. Bohlen and Mr. Eldredge to
the contrary notwithstanding.10
This brings us once more to the matter of authorities. Mr. Eldredge has
"principally relied" upon Longmeid v. Holliday," in which the defendant-vendor
sold a defective lamp to A, whose wife B suffered harm because of the defect.
I stated in my first article that "there is no statement in the report that the defect
was reasonably observable."' 2 Mr. Eldredge attempts to refute this point by referring to an "averment" that the lamp was "cracked and leaky," etc. Even if
the "averment" corresponded to the facts (the court's opinion states only that
the "lamp was defectively constructed"), it does not necessarily follow that the
"crack" was reasonably discoverable. Whether it was would depend upon its
size and location. Such a defect in a new lamp is not necessarily obvious. At
9

Farage, rupra note 1, at 160. /ialicsadded.
10The analogy to sales of land suggested by Mr. Eldredge is not helpful, because historically
concepts of feudal law which have permeated the law of real property have restricted the scope of
the owner-vendor's liability. Thus, the owner of land has been held to owe no duty of inspection
either before a sale or a lease of the premises. On the other hand the duty in chattel cases has been
broader. Thus, a lessor of a chattel has been treated in some cases as being under a duty to make
a reasonable inspection of a chattel before leasing: Collette v. Page, 44 R, 1. 26, 114 A. 136 (1921);
("We intend only to
Saunders System Birmingham Co. v. Adams, 217 Ala. 621, 117 So. 72 (1928)
hold that he must exercise reasonable diligence to know the condition of his machines before letting
them into the hands of drivers for use on the highways. He must in that regard exercise such simple
and available tests as the intended use would suggest to sensible and right-minded persons-'the jury
being at last the judges.") This v'ew is followed by REsTATEMENT, Toss (1934) § 408, comment a.
116 Ex. 761, 155 Eng. Repr. 752 (1851). See Eldredge, this issue, page 271.
12Farage, rupra note 1, at 164.
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any rate, the defect was either latent or patent. If latent, whether it was reasonably discoverable will forever remain a mystery; and to say it was reasonably
discoverable is a gratuitious assumption. On the other hand, if the defect
was patent, the cage would fall under the principle of RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 388,
comment i, which provides that vendor need not disclose even known defects, much
less look for them, if they are obvious on casual inspection. Whether the defect
was latent or patent, therefore, the case does not support Mr. Eldredge's contention that it denies the existence of a duty to discover reasonably observable latent
defects.1*
Quite apart from whether the defect was reasonably observable, the plaintiff
sued only on the theory that the defendant had' been guilty of "intentional
fraud," and judgment was given for the defendant because fraud was not proved.
The question of whether a vendor owes a duty to make a reasonable inspection,
it is submitted, was not squarely raised. In the third place the court stresses the
lack of contractual privity between the plaintiff and defendant, that is, the theory
of the Huset case. 1 4 Mr. Eldredge quotes from Bottomley v. Bannister, 5 which
in the course of dicta16 said:
"It would serve no useful purpose to go through the various decisions in detail, but in my judgment it has not yet been decided by
any authority binding on this Court that a person selling an article
which he did not know to be dangerous can be held liable to a person with whom he has made no contract, by reason of the fact that
reasonable inquiries might have enabled him to discover that the
17
article was in fact dangerous."'
Mr. Eldredge, in using this quotation to support his construction of Longmeid v.
Holliday, underlines the words "which he did not know to be dangerous." I should
13Note that the jury expressly found that the "averment" that vendor had knowledge of the defect was unfounded. If the defect was obvious as Mr. Eldredge suggests, why did not the jury find
it "practically certain the vendor did know of it," and why was not his denial "met with incredulity
by the jury" as Mr. Eldredge argues would be the case when defects are "plain on the outer face of
the chattel"? See Eldredge, supra note 1, at 329.
14120 Fed. 865 (1903). I repeat, in answer to Mr. Eldredge's quotation from Mr. Bohlen in
1905, that whatever Mr. Bohlen's views may have been at that time, in 1930 when the RESTATEMENT
was drafted he professed uncertainty; he was not certain one way or the other: 8 PRoc. A. L. 1. 239
(1930). Moreover, he drafted sections 399 and 402 of the RESTATEMENT, the former imposing
liability where the vendor had knowledge of the danger or facts pointing thereto, the latter flatly
imposing in blackletters a duty to make a reasonable inspection. It is notew'-thy that in his second
article Mr. Eldrede no longer presses for the view that § 402 should be n.strued as merely an
iteration of § 399. See Farage, supra note 1, at 169.
15(1932) 1 K. B. 458; Eldredge, Vendor's "Dutyj' to Inspect Chattels-A Retldy (1941), 45
DicausoN L. Rnv. 272.
leThe case involved the liability owing by a vendor of land for a defective appliance installcd
by him thereon. (Scrutton, L. J., says at p. 474: "My view of the law is that the installation being

part of the realty, the cases a to chattels do not apply ..
17(192) 1 Ki B. 458, 480.

Italics added.
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continue the underlineation under the words "to a person with whom he has made
no contract." That Bottomley v. Bannister was concerned with tht theory of the
Huset case and its exceptions is made clear by the next two sentences of the court's
opinion, which Mr. Eldredge fails to quote, and which deal with the exception as
to articles "inherently dangerous":
"As pointed out by Hamilton J. in Blacker v. Lake & Elliott, Ld.,
the question whether an article belongs to a dangerous class is, when
there is no dispute of fact as to the nature of the article, a question of
law for the judge. In my judgment, the judge in the present case
ought to have held the Halliday boiler without a flue not to be an
article dangerous per se."
The next case cited by Mr. Eldredge as supporting him, Moore v. Jefferson
D. & D. Co., 18 I discussed fully in my first article. He now concedes that is
not a strong case, although in his first article he cited it as flatly supporting him.1 9
However, he still construes it as denying any duty of inspection. My answer is
to ask for reference to one single statement in the opinion, even by dictum, which
denies a duty of inspection other than because of lack of contractual privity.
With respect to the seventeen cases cited by Professor Eldredge in footnote
8o,10 he conceded in his first article that:
"As to these cases it may be said that the vendor could not have
discovered the defect ieven if he had used 'reasonable care' in inspecting them. 21 (However, in seven of them .. .the court flatly
said that the vendor's duty did not extend beyond revealing known
defects .... . .22
If this is not -an admission that these cases do not flatly hold in support of his view,
I do not understand the meaning which he intends one to ascribe to those words.
23
He now apparently contends that those cases do hold in his favor, but limits
discussion to only several of them.
18169 La. 1156, 126 So. 691 (1930).
1DEldredge, supra note 1, at 323, footnote 84.
ZOid. at 522.
21ihid.
-ibid. footnote 81. Italics added. With Mr. Eldredge's statement (in footnote 22 of his
article
in this issue respecting certain cases he cited in note 80 of his original article) that "L do
not believe Professor Farage is justified in considering these cases as definite dicta imposing a duty
"Itmay be that
to inspect", compare hisprevious statement in footnote 81 of hisoriginal article:
the court was merely stating the case most favorably to the plaintiff and holding, even 'then, that he
had no case. On the other hand, it is posrible to argue that the language implies some duty of
inspection."

(Italics added).

28Eldredge, supra note 15, at 273. If the cases in footnote 80 of his original article "do
quoted statement", they do not do so by way of holding. Because of limita.
literally
support (his)
tions of space, I shall
discuss only those he does. I am prepared, however, to distingui~h allthe
other cases he cited.
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His first is Peaslee-Gaulbert v. McMath's Adm'r.2 4 Suit was to recover
damages for the death of a person killed when a can of "Japan dryer" (apparently
a kind of varnish) exploded because the user brought it in contact with a lighted
flame. The dryer was in no respect defective, nor would any inspection have disclosed defects since there were none... The court stated that
". .. the substance of all the evidence is that this dryer was not
explosive, or inflammable, unless brought in contact with a lighted
flame, and was not inherently or imminently dangerous or dangerous
at all if handled or used with ordinary care; that 'No. 1 T Japan
Dryer' was manufactured substantially by the same formula all over
the country and sold to the trade generally as an article of common
use in the varnish business; that none of the manufacturers or dealers
ever placed on their cans containing this dryer any danger or caution
sign or mark or other thing to indicate that care should be used in
handling it. It might also be here remarked that there is no statute
in this state requiring a danger or caution mark of any kind to be
25
placed on articles like this."
In other words, the only question was whether the defendant-vendor should have
used a label warning of dangers which were well known to the trade at large.
There was absolutely no question raised by the facts as to the vendor's duty of inspection, because there was no evidence of any defect which caused the injury.
It is submitted, therefore, that whatever the court says about the non-existence of
a duty to inspect is pure dictum.
The next case cited by Mr. Eldredge is Belcher v. Goff Bros.26 Defendantvendor sold a mixture of gasoline and kerosene as kerosene, and plaintiff suffered
injuries from an explosion occurring because of its use as kerosene. There is no
evidence or statement of fact anywhere in the opinion that the fact of admixture
was reasonably discoverable by the vendor. Moreover, the decision turned upon
whether it was error to refuse plaintiff's points for charge. These requests in
effect sought to impose absolute liability upon the vendor as under warranty. None
of the requested charges rested upon the theory that defendant owed a duty of
inspection which would have disclosed the danger. Again, therefore, what the
court says about the non-existence of a duty to inspect would seem to be dictum.
In Tourte v. Horton Mfg. Co. 27 a vendee of a washing machine was injured
because of a wringer which was defective for lack of oil. She knew before the
24148 Ky. 265, 146 S. W. 770 (1912).

25146 S. W. 770, 774.
26145 Va. 448, 134 S. E. 588 (1926).
27108 Cal. App. 22, 290 'Pac. 919 (1930).
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accident of the defect and its cause; the vendor did not know. Under those facts
the question of whether the vendor owed a duty of inspection was not at all
essential to the determination of the case. Had he inspected, his sole duty would
have been to warn. Since the vendee was aware of the defect, the warning would
no longer be required. 2 8 Under these circumstances, how can the court's language
about whether the vendor must inspect be anything but dictum?
The next case cited by Mr. Eldredge is Noble v. Sears-Roebuck & Co.2 9 A
steam pressure cooker exploded, injuring purchaser's employee. On demurrer to
plaintiff's declaration, the court held:
"The complaint does not allege as against the seller, or at all,
that the cooker was inherently dangerous to the life or limb of any
one using it, nor that such dangerous condition, if any, was known
or should have been known to the seller, nor that the seller in any
way failed to exercise good faith and fair dealing."' 0
If there was not even an allegation, much less evidence, that the vendor knew or
should have known of the defect, or even that the article was dangerous, how
can this case possibly hold that the vendor owes no duty of inspection?
In Isbell v. Biederman Furniture Co."1 the wife of a purchaser of a bed was
injured when the bed collapsed because of a knot in the wood rendering weak the
board on which the slats rested. The court denied recovery because "the wife,
not being a party to the contract of purchase, cannot maintain this action." 82 In
addition, the court stresses the fact that the vendee could "see the knot in the slat
as well as the dealer himself."3 3 This being so, the case falls under the rule of
RESTATEMENT, TORTS §388, comment i,31 which provides that a vendor need not
disclose even known defects if they are reasonably observable by the vendee.
Either the theory of lack of contractual privity, or the theory that the defect was
observable by the vendee, makes entirely unnecessary any consideration of whether
a vendor must inspect chattels. What the court says in that regard, therefore, can
hardly be accepted as a holding.
28"If the safety devices needed oiling, the absence of oil was known to appellant and not to
respondent. . . When this knowledge is with the buyer and the defect is unknown to the seller,
the latter is not liable.": 290 Pac. 919, 920. Compare RSTATEMRN!, TORTS (1934) § 388, comment i,stating that the supplier need not give warning of observable defects, even when vendor has
actual knowledge. Even had vendor briefly operated the machine, it is doubtful if such operation
would have disclosed the danger, since the vendee testified that the machine operated "perfectly" for
her for an hour.
2912 F. Supp. 181 (W. D. Wash. 1935).
3Oid. at 182.
31115 S. W. (2d) 46 (Mo.App. 1938).

32id. at 49. The court cited many cases including Huset v. Case Threshing Mach. Co., 120
Fed. 865 (1903), which the court then discusses.
33id.
34Discussed supra, note 28.
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Boyd v. 1. C. Penney Co., Inc.85 is conceded by Professor Eldredge to rest
entirely upon a special statute limiting the liability of a vendor to contractual
damages. What the court might have held about the duty of inspection in the
absence of statute is beside the point. Moreover, the court expressly states:
"If there were any defects and vices in this dress, or if it contaied any injurious and deleterious substances that could have caused
plaintiff's injuries, the defendant did not know of these at the time
the dress was sold to the plaintiff, nor did it have any reasonable
means oi knowing or ascertaining before selling the dress that it
contained any injurious or poisonous substances. It could hardly
be contended that it was the duty of the defendant to have each one
of the dresses which it purchased from a manufacturer analyzed and
inspected for deleterious substances before offering the dresses for
sale."3 6
Mr. Eldredge is critical of the fact that I omit a discussion of two cases, State
to use v. Consolidated Gas, etc. Co. 8 7 and Camden Fire Ins. Co. v. Peterman,8
which he discussed in his original paper under the heading "Honest Misrepresentation of Chattel's Safety." What was stated under that caption, I supposed,
was intended to deal only with the effect of an honest misrepresentotion per se as
a possible form of active misconduct and not with the duty of inspection.3 9 Since
he discussed these two cases only in relation to the aforesaid title, I refrained from
discussing them in my first article only lest I be accused of charging him with
citing the case for a point not intended by him. Since he now relies upon them,
I shall be glad to consider them. The first involved an action for the death of
an infant resulting from a defective chattel purchased by the infant's parents. A
demurrer to the declaration was sustained, but only because there was no privity of
contract between the child and the vendor.40 Again, the theory on which the court
s5195 So. 87 (La. App. 1940).
36id. at 88. (Italics added).
87146 Md. 390, 126 A. 105 (1924).
88278 Mich. 615, 270 N. W. 807 (1937).

89The two cases were discussed by Mr. Eldredge as illustrating the statement that: "Consequently a vendor's honest representation that a chattel is free of defects, when based upon reliable
past experience, cannot be branded as a negligent act merely because the vendor has not personally
investigated the chattel. Such a representation is in accord with practically universal human con.
duct.": Eldredge, supra note 1, at 319. In the light of the surrounding context, as I construed that
sentence, it meant only that an honest misrepresentafon is not per se actionable as affirmative misconduct merely because the "vendor has not personally investigated the chattel". At least, I could
not feel certain that Mr. Eldredge meant to consider, at that point, the effect of the omission o
inspection apart from misrepresentation, since he addresses himself to that problem in his next subheading.
40The court expressly states, "...

there is no privity of contract between the deceased infant

and the defendant, and there is no allegation of such privity of contract set out in the declaration.
This allegation was a necessary part of the declaration, and doubtless would have been made, had it

not been for the fact that the evidence which could be adduced would not support such an allegation."

126 A. 105, 107.
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denied recovery was that of the Huse case, and not that a vendor owes no duty
of inspection. In the second case, an action was brought by an insurance company
against a vendor for damages paid on a policy for personal injuries suffered by
-the insured because of a defective gasoline stove. Defendant moved for a directed
verdict not on the theory that no duty of inspection was owing, but "upon tht
theory that while an accident happened, no proof was adduced to show any
negligence upon the part of defendant in connection with said accident.'"
The
uppler court, in sustaining the position of the defendant, states that "the defects
that it (the chattel) had were hidden and unknown to the seller and could not be
readily ascertainedwithout the use of gasoline."4 2 Apparently the court felt that
it was unreasonable to require the vendor to burn gasoline in a new stove before
selling it as such. In my judgment the case holds not that the vendor owes no
duty of reasonable inspection, but merely that there was no negligence or violation
of the duty.
So much for the authorities relied upon by Professor Eldredge. Both he and
I have given our construction of the cases, and it is for the reader to decide whether
there is a single clear-cut decision which flatly holds that a vendor owes no duty
of inspection. It is also for the reader to decide for himself who is guilty of
"benevolent yearning" regarding the effect of the cases.
The next point which Professor Eldredge makes, I submit, is a "red herring"
having nothing to do with our controversy. He suggests that when I refer to the
doctrine of the Huset case (which denies recovery for personal injuries resulting
from a defective chattel to one not in contractual privity with the supplier unless
thle case falls within one of Judge Sanborn's three classic exceptions to the rule)
I am confusing its applicability to manufacturer-vendors with the application of
the doctrine to vendors of chattels manufactured by others. He proceeds to suggest that while the doctrine of the Huset case has been discredited as applied to
the former, it has not been discredited as applied to the latter. With this point
I had and have no concern.' 3 What is important is that as Professor Eldredge
concedes, some courts still continue (notwithstanding MacPherson v. Buick Motor
Co.Y) to require contractual privity between the vendor and the plaintiff. If a
vendor owed no duty of inspection to either those in or out of contractualprivity,
there would be no need for courts to resort to the requirement of contractualprivity
41270 N. W. 807, 808.
42ibid. Italics added.
48Note, however, that RSTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) § 388 (see especially lines 3.6 of blackletter and comment k, last sentence) rejects the doctrine of the Huset case as applied to all suppliers

of chattels, to the extent that it suggests that contractual privity is normally a prerequisite for li.
ability; and that § 394 (specifically applicable to manufacturers) and §§ 399 and 402 (specifically
applicable to vendors of chattels manufactured by third persons) all incorporate §388 by reference.
44217 N. Y. 382,

111 N. E.1050 (1916).

DICKINSON LAW

REVIEW

in order to deny recovery for failure to inspect,"4 in tort actions alleging such a duty.
In my first article I referred to two New York cases 6 which, Mr. Eldredge
concedes, bold against his view, but which he criticized because in the particular
cases the duty of inspection imposed was too onerous. To my observation that
it may be conceded that the particular burden was unreasonably onerous without
invalidating the argument in favor of imposing a reasonable duty of inspection,
Mr. Eldredge replies:
"Ido not follow this reasoning. To my mind the decision of a
court is either sound upon the record presented to it or it is unsound.
If Professor Farage agrees that the New York decisions were decided
wrongly upon the records presented, I do not see how he can go on
to argue that they should still be accepted as authority for imposing
liability on some other set of facts. If Professor Farage agrees that
the vendors in the two New York cases should not have been under
any duty of inspection on the facts of those cases then, by his own
reasoning, the court's decision to the contrary is either unsound or
7
should be considered a mere dictum."'
The suggestion that these cases may involve mere dictum scarcely deserves consideration, since Mr. Eldredge definitely conceded in his original article that they
were flatly against him. His inability to follow my reasoning can be explained
by his obvious attachment for the Aristotelian rule of formal logic (the "law of
excluded middle") that everything is either A or not-A. An opinion, he feels,
can be only right or wrong; it cannot be partially right and partially wrong. An
opinion which announces sound rules of negligence, but unsound rules of causation
or of damages for him must be entirely wrong. Similarly, if a court requires adherence to a too-high standard of care, that fact must of itself contaminate all
other holdings and parts of the opinion. Whether this view is sound is a matter
of philosophical faith which has often been challenged and discredited. 48 For
my part, I am willing to accept sound parts of an opinion, even if I feel that other
parts must be rejected. Accordingly, I am willing to accept the holdings of the
New York cases that there is a duty to make a reasonable inspection, while at the
same time rejecting their holdings that the particular standard of care imposed was
reasonable.
"5Professor Eldredge stresses the fact that one of Judge Sanborn's exceptions to the rule requiring contractual privity involves a vendor who sells a chattel knowing of the defect. He contends that this is significant as suggesting that there is no duty to inspect. He refrains from referring to the other two "exceptions" which do not necessarily require actual knowledge for their
application.
4"Garvey v. Namm, 136 App. Div. 815, 121 N. Y. S. 442 (1910); Santise v. Martins, Inc.,
258 App. Div. 663, 17 N. Y. S. (2d) 741 (1940).
47EIdredge, supra note 15, at 279. Italics added.
48BELL, THE SEARCH FOR TRUTH (1934) 100 etseq.
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Finally, Professor Eldredge still insists that a duty should not be imposed
upon a vendor to make a reasonable inspection of chattels he sells, because it is
impossible in advance to specify exactly the nature and extent of the vendor's inspection. The fact that the bulk of tort law is predicated upon the conveniently
vague formula of the "reasonable man" he rejects as an unsatisfactory answer. In
this connection he distinguishes "active" conduct causing harm from omission or
non-feasance resulting therein. As far as I can see, the RESTATEMENT fails to
distinguish between these two types of wrong when it talks about the standard of
the "reasonable man."
Be that as it may, Professor Eldredge puts the case of the owner of a retail
hardware store who seeks advice from his lawyer concerning the duty to inspect
chattels. He finds utterly absurd the reply, to the effect that the "standard of the
reasonable man" must be observed, because he feels such an answer is too vague
and meaningless as a rule of law. He says, "In this situation 'the knowne certaintie of the law' is the only 'safetie of all' vendors."
In his original article Mr. Eldredge referred, apparently with approval, to the
well-established rule that a possessor of land owes a duty to business guests to
make a reasonable inspection of his land 4" I suppose, too, he would accept the
holding of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. 5° that the manufacturer of a car who
buys parts prepared by other people must make a reasonable inspection of these
articles before using them. I suppose also that he accepts the holding of Saunders
System Birmingham Co. v. Adams51 that a lessor of chattels for hire owes a duty
to inspect the chattels. I say "I suppose," because otherwise Mr. Eldredge would
be placing himself in the position of denying that there is ever a duty to inspect
anything under any circumstances. If he accepts as true that a duty to inspect is
owing by a possessor of land to his business guests, by a manufacturer to inspect
parts prepared by others, and by a lessor of a chattel for hire, I take it (since he
apparently identifies good law with rules that make for certainty) that Professor
Eldredge is prepared to give specific answers to the following questions involving
such persons:
Does observable mean visible to the eye from the outside? Does
it mean observable only if you look for it seeking danger, or observable by the casual glance given in unpacking and handling of appliances installed by the possessor of business premises, or of parts
procured by manufacturers from others? Does it require the re49Eldredge, rupra note 1, at 321, footnote 76, citing RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) § 342.
60217 N. Y. 382, 111 N. E. 1050 (1916), adopted by RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) § 395,

comment f.
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Ala. 621, 117 So. 72 (1928).

Mr. Eldredge has also endorsed the duty of inspection

imposed by Heaven v. Pender, it Q. B. D. 503 (1883): Eldredge, supra note 1, at 331,
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moval of easily removable parts to see what is visible underneath?
Does it mean visible as you view the chattels or premises from a normal standing or sitting posture, or visible as you get down and look
all over them? Does it mean detectable by the sense of feel, or
smell, or hearing, or taste as well as sight? Must a lessor, or a
maiufacturer using another's parts, or a possessor of business premises, look at, handle, smell, taste, and listen to the chattels or premises? Must they palpate chattels inside to feel the defects? Must
they tap them with a handy hammer to hear the defect. If an
equally simple and not inconvenient test, such as using litmus paper
will make the defects observable by sight, as palpation makes them
observable by feeling, is this required? Must a possessor of business
premises pull up floors to examine rafters? Must he inspect stairways hourly, daily, weekly, monthly, or yearly? Must he stand on
high ladders to examine ceilings, or need he notice only such defects
as are observable from a standing postue? If a department store
provides chairs for customers who are looking at goods, must the
chairs be turned upside down during inspection? Must . . . etc.,
etc? ad nauseam. 52
Mr. Eldredge's argument requiring certainty of standard before imposing a duty of
inspection proves too much. For it would deny the existence of any duty on anyone's part to make a reasonable inspection under any circumstances. Query, can
the vague standard of the "reasonable man" be separated, even from cases involving omission or failure to inspect, as Professor Eldredge suggests? Need it
be reiterated that the standards to which the actor must conform are in the bulk
of cases not determined as a matter of law by courts, but are determined by the
jury along with the facts of the cases. 6 8 The lawyer who can always anticipate
precisely what standards the juries will impose must be possessed of oracular
powers.
Professor Eldredge's reliance upon the analogy of the United States Supreme
Court decision holding a criminal statute unconstitutional has doubtful basis. In
the first place criminal cases are not necessarily decided on the same principles as
those involving torts. In the second place we are concerned with a common law
duty; I am not aware that even in the criminal cases any court has ever set aside
a conviction on a charge of a common law crime because the common law principles pertaining thereto were not yet fully developed and explicit. Courts still
have difficulty in deciding upon the necessary elements of many crimes. Indeed,
S2The writer is indebted to Professor Eldredge for suggesting many of these questions, most of
them being
quoted almost verbatim from his original article: Eldredge, supra note 1, at 329, 330.
53See quotation from Saunders System Birmingham Co. v. Adams, supra note 10.
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the development of the law regarding common law crimes has been a gradual,
never-ending process. In any event, if the analogy of the criminal statute case
affects the duty of a vendor to inspect chattels, why does it not affect equally the
duty to inspect owing by an owner of business premises, by a lessor of chattels,
or by the defendant in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.? If a rule requiring a
vendor of chattels to make a "reasonable" inspection would be so vague as to make
the law "a ass," why are not the rules requiring the foregoing persons to make a
"reasonable" inspection equally vague so as to render the law "a ass" likewise?
To conclude, I should like to repeat the closing remarks in my first article:
"What has been said here may not be conclusive as to whether a duty should be
imposed to make any inspection. It is submitted, however, that neither the cases
to date nor the RESTATEMENT rule out such a duty, and that the arguments advanced thus far against its imposition rest upon at least debatable grounds."
CARLISLE, PA.

D. J. FARAGE

